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Dining,*Whining,*and*Opining:*From*the*
Googleplex*to*Beijing*
 
Editorial by Jeffrey Barlow 
 
All editorials are at bottom opinion pieces; otherwise we would launch 
them under other, more objective titles. In this October posting of 
Interface, I discuss recent travels to Silicon Valley against the backdrop 
of the current economic panic on Wall Street. I argue that the world 
market, due to the impact of the Internet, is a unified one requiring that 
any solutions to the crisis take into account opinions abroad, particularly 
in Asia. 
 
My travels began in mid-September when I had the good fortune to 
travel to Google in Mountain View, California, where I observed the 
opening several hours of this year's "Zeitgeist" conference—Google's 
annual extravagant gift to its more important partners. I was not included 
in this group, but while in good faith looking for the conference to which 
I had been invited, I was misdirected to the Zeitgeist auditorium just as 
the lights went down, dazzling digitized displays came up, and James 
Fallows introduced Jared Diamond, both particular heroes of mine. As I 
had two hours to find my own conference and there were plenty of extra 
seats, I saw no reason to hustle out. 
 
Ninety very informative and entertaining minutes later, I went from 
there to another part of the Googleplex for the conference of the Family 
Online Safety Institute. There I viewed the PBS documentary "Growing 
Up Online," with its producer Rachel Dretzen and a number of 
representatives from various interest groups and industry sectors who 
were also there to discuss the question of safety on the Internet. This 
group was dressed very differently than the Zeitgeist audience, less 
entertained than concerned, and our lunch, while tasty and filling, was 
somewhat south of the fine dining I had seen being prepared for the 
Zeitgeist luncheon as I left.  
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Then that evening it was back to the Intel complex in Hillsboro, Oregon, 
to hear Dr. Kanwal Rekhi, the most successful of Indian-born 
entrepreneurs in the U.S., discuss "The Branding of India, Indians, and 
Indians in America" at the local meeting of The Indus Entrepreneurs, or 
TIE. While now immensely wealthy and treated with open awe by the 
audience largely composed of young Indian engineers, many from Intel 
or other Silicon Forest firms, as we Oregonians like to call our own  
high-tech enclave, he chronicled a period when Indians like himself 
were met with suspicion and steered forcefully away from the front 
office to careers as techies. More than once when seeking venture capital 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s he basically was told that his small 
group of Indian entrepreneurial friends was not fundable because they 
had no white guys in management and sales. Since then, Dr. Rekhi has 
gone on to found, work with or invest in more than fifty high tech firms 
worldwide. 
 
In between my conferences at Google and at Intel, I met with a variety 
of people in the industry, including members of our Berglund Center 
board. Throughout this rapid series of events, I was informed by my 
reading of one of the books reviewed in this issue, Palfrey and Gasser's 
Born Digital. Palfrey and Gasser concentrate upon a world of Internet-
enabled "Digital Natives" who promise, if conditions are right, to make 
immense contributions to human progress. But while thoroughly 
enjoying the work and finding it a useful guidebook to the people I was 
meeting from the Silicon Valley to the Silicon Forest, it was also oddly 
dissonant with the events unfolding around me. 
 
My travel took place from September 16th to the 17th, while the 
U.S. stock market fell almost 800 points and rose 700, at one point 
gyrating over a range of more than 600 points in one day. American 
financial authorities and the White House rushed to create an immense 
and somewhat vague relief package that may or may not stem the 
current outgoing tide of investment capital and the associated decline of 
financial markets worldwide.  
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Behind this worldwide financial panic is, of course, electronic 
communication and computer-enabled investment practices ranging 
from derivatives to currency arbitrage. The net has made us one bourse. 
And the economic role of "foreigners"—a term that while ostensibly 
merely descriptive can quickly become pejorative—has altered 
significantly. In the 18th century we were also one bourse, a net of 
precious metal extraction and trading that took silver from Peruvian and 
Mexican mines to Europe, onto India, and then finally to China, which 
was silver's ultimate consumer. That market was held together not by 
electrons but by slow and uncertain winds pushing creaking sailing 
ships, when all worked properly, across vast oceans of space and time. 
Then, few were aware that the price of silver in China was somehow 
related to the ability of English or American entrepreneurs to purchase 
iron and coal for emerging modern industries. 
 
While the net of sailing ships also transformed economies, it did so very 
slowly, and so subtly that the effect was easy to miss. Now the 
transformations, occurring in Internet time, are so rapid that they again 
defy comprehension. But it is apparent that the world has just changed 
significantly. While many of those changes are unknowable at present, 
certain elements are clear. One is the simple truth that we are one 
bourse; foreigners, Americans, our fates are very much intertwined. 
 
Americans like to think that our influence upon the "outside" world is 
disproportional to its influence on us. Clearly our importance to the 
world market is disproportionate to our numbers, even to our wealth, 
because of our reckless willingness to borrow, both as individuals and as 
a nation. But our current reliance on outside capital to finance the 
resultant deficit, and our willingness to import oil even at catastrophic 
prices, makes us particularly vulnerable to the perceptions of foreign 
investors. 
 
We are also more dependent than we have ever been on the talents of 
what many call "foreigners" even if those so designated are nationalized 
citizens or even American-born, as my recent travels demonstrated to 
me. Indian techies are ubiquitous in Silicon Valley and of course, the 
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meeting of TIE at Intel demonstrated their importance in the Silicon 
Forest as well. The estimate of the Indian techies at Intel was that they 
were more than one third of the total engineering work force. 
 
All of these people, Americans or not, Palfrey and Gasser call "Digital 
Natives." But those authors remind us that this is by no means a 
"generation," because of the gap between the digitally-enabled wealthy 
and the very dominant poor, but rather a select "population." But the 
cultural context in which this minority progresses is surrounded by 
multitudes who see the intrusion of a global culture centered upon the 
values of science and the Western tradition, not as an opportunity but as 
a threat to indigenous cultures and beliefs.  
 
Moreover, as Americans we have an additional problem. Our recent 
high-handedness in international affairs has added greatly to long-term 
resentments at our past pronounced economic, cultural, and political 
dominance. For example, our daughter is studying in Beijing at 
Tsinghua University, China's own geek and policy wonk paradise, with a 
group of twenty-somethings, including Africans, Russians, Palestinians, 
Iranians, and some few Americans. When one of their number arrived at 
lunch recently and breathlessly announced that the American economy 
had finally collapsed, the group largely met the news with excited 
approval, seeing it in part as a possible beginning of their own liberation 
from American influence.  
 
That luncheon table in Beijing is also the world of the Internet. It is far 
more than an increasingly homogenous—because increasingly 
interactive—group of twenty-somethings bopping to an MP3-delivered 
world beat. It includes many talented and ambitious people, as well as 
many poor ones, who emphatically dislike America, partly from past 
experience, if also from less well-founded resentments. 
 
  
The current financial panic presents Americans with a number of 
unpalatable choices. We are now far enough from the initial suggestion 
of a five hundred billion dollar bailout of troubled firms—since grown to 
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seven hundred billion—to have read the polls, and to have had an 
opportunity for specialists and politicians to speak. It is evident that 
there is much opposition to the proposed bailout, currently a three-page 
document entirely lacking in details. 
 
Here I wish to confine myself to one small corner of these issues, the 
question of Asian support for such a bailout. Such support might be 
expressed at the simplest level in rising Asian markets, which would in 
turn generate capital to support the American economy. Others hope that 
foreign institutions will kick into the seven hundred billion pot in order 
to protect their own economies from the consequence of what is feared 
to be, failing a bailout, at least a prolonged American recession. 
 
Some foreign observers have pointed out that when the Asian economies 
slumped in the late '90s, our own advice, forcefully delivered through 
the American dominated International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, was that these countries had to suffer in order to recover. Their 
firms, even if long-established flagships, had to go down in the name of 
"market discipline." Market discipline, however, seems suddenly to have 
become absolutely unimportant—a fact much noted abroad. 
 
Other Asians believe that the underlying problem is more than a 
temporary capital shortage remediable with a massive transfusion. Some 
feel that the underlying issue is a distorted financial system lacking 
meaningful regulation which serves in large part to regularly transfer 
huge sums to a small percentage of consumers, leaving the vast majority 
to borrow in order to finance their purchases of Asian products. As one 
influential Chinese investor said, "You have been selling mirror images 
reflected in other mirrors, and it is over." 
 
The danger, it seems to me, is another sudden shock, perhaps a rapid 
decline in the value of the dollar. This would presumably stampede all 
doubters into signing on the dotted line, three page long agreement or 
not. This is the implied threat held over the American people and 
Congress. 
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There well could be some continuing decline—after all the seven 
hundred billion will not reduce our oil bill, nor our deficits, but rather 
add rapidly to them. But there are factors which reduce the probability of 
a rapid decline. Most Asian holders of American dollars, notably China, 
Taiwan, and Japan, do not want to dump that currency. Those holdings 
are far the largest part of their own accumulated wealth.  
 
In addition, Asians truly want to see the American economy recover, not 
temporarily, but in a manner that would promise more than just a 
caesura before the inevitable subsequent panic. For many of these 
observers, themselves members of highly cooperative societies, a 
solution that would strengthen consumers in general—perhaps by 
protecting those holding delinquent mortgages—would also be a 
strongly positive indication that the U.S. now intends to come to grips 
with another important part of the underlying problem. 
 
Another positive sign for Asians would be some indication that the 
investment of seven hundred billions of taxpayer dollars would purchase 
public equity in the firms being bailed out; equity which could later be 
sold, permitting the American state to reduce its deficits, which would 
further strengthen the economy. This was the model followed by 
Sweden in dealing with a very similar difficulty in 1992.  
 
And there are, after all, also very different models to examine. When the 
Asian Contagion of 1997 hit Asian economies, a major issue was how to 
support effective demand, how to bring value back into the economies as 
world investment retreated and Asian currencies collapsed. The Chinese 
chose to invest in education and transportation infrastructure. This put 
money into the coffers of the local and provincial governments which 
managed the projects, and ultimately into the hands of workers. The 
result was that while Chinese growth slumped, it still continued. After 
the smoke cleared, China had thousands of miles of new roads, railways, 
many new educational institutions, and a populace that felt that such 
suffering as had occurred had been widely shared. Once we can decide 
upon an appropriate solution, we still must decide who is "us" and who 
is "them." Any bailout of troubled financial institutions must include 
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foreign ones as well. We need the talents and the investment funds of 
foreigners, and to pull back into a fortress America mentality would be 
worse than reckless; it would be stupid. Yet it will be a tempting 
argument for many who do not fully understand the roots of our 
problems, or who do not wish to solve them in an equitable manner. 
 
But it is much easier to say what can go wrong than to be optimistic. We 
got into this mess in part because of the breakdown not only of our 
banking system, but also because of the breakdown of our political 
system, gridlocked in partisan struggles while quietly ceding real power 
to those private interests which fund the electoral system and effectively 
preclude real regulation. And our traditional watchdog against such 
crimes, the press, has mutated into some sort of infotainment monster 
that now gropes to understand, let alone explain, where we are now and 
how we got this way.  
 
So many questions: will the captains of finance who put us on these 
shoals be rewarded for their prior greed from the two thousand dollars 
per American man, woman, and child required to fund a bailout by even 
the most minimal estimate? Will the incoming President be left with 
enough resources, let alone power, to referee what promises to be yet 
another struggle over the corpse of the market economy? Can either of 
the candidates understand this mess sufficiently to help solve it? Does 
the electorate even care? Can we build a consensus to look at new 
solutions or will we depend yet again on the Old Time Religion to see us 
through? 
 
And all these questions arise in an environment where information, 
incorrect information, and outright misinformation, circulate only 
slightly slower than light. The world is not only watching now, but will 
be a participant in this issue, and an increasingly skeptical one.  
 
I conclude with an incident from Google's Zeitgeist. One of the speakers 
was Gao Xiqing, a very sophisticated graduate of Duke Law, a former 
Wall Street attorney, and a protester at Tian An Menin 1989. Now he is 
the head of the state institution which selects Chinese investments 
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abroad. He was asked how China might feel about future investments in 
the United States including, of course, those financial instruments which 
support our deficit. He paused and selecting his words carefully, replied 
that China was going to behave as a rational investor and observe very 
carefully. The price of silver in China—in this case, dollars—is again 
important, and this time around we had better recognize that fact.  
